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Abstract
Central bank transparency has become the topic of a lively public and academic debate on
monetary policy. Unfortunately, it has been complicated by the fact that transparency is
a qualitative concept that is hard to measure. This paper proposes a comprehensive index
for central bank transparency that comprises the political, economic, procedural, policy
and operational aspects of central banking. The index is compiled for nine major central
banks. It is based on a detailed analysis of actual information disclosure and reveals a rich
variety in the degree and dynamics of central bank transparency.
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1 Introduction
Central bank transparency has become the topic of a lively public and academic debate on mon-
etary policy. The public demands transparency to achieve accountability of central banks that
have increasingly become independent. In addition, a burgeoning academic literature analyzes
the economic consequences of greater transparency of monetary policy. The debate on trans-
parency has been complicated by the fact that it is a qualitative concept for which few measures
exist. This paper proposes a comprehensive index for central bank transparency that comprises
the political, economic, procedural, policy and operational aspects of central banking. The
index is compiled for nine major central banks for five years (1998-2002) and is based on a
scrutiny of actual information disclosure. It reveals the various ways in which central banks
have become transparent and provides the prospect of an empirical evaluation of the theoretical
literature on this issue.
To give a sneak preview of our findings, the most transparent central banks in our sample
are the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Swedish Riksbank and the Bank of England. The
subtop is formed by the Bank of Canada, the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve.
The least transparent central banks are the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Bank of Japan and
the Swiss National Bank. Although the most transparent central banks are all inflation tar-
geters, this monetary policy framework appears neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
for transparency.
An important advantage of our transparency index is that it distinguishes various aspects
of transparency based on their role in the monetary decision making process. It allows us to
identify how central banks differ in their emphasis of various aspects, independent of their
monetary policy framework, how greater transparency manifests itself over time, and how
different aspects affect economic performance.
There are several other papers that provide useful descriptions of central bank transparency
in practice. Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999) provide a well structured descrip-
tion in the form of case studies but focus their analysis on inflation targeting. An elaborate
informal discussion and review of central bank transparency is presented by Blinder, Good-
hart, Hildebrand, Lipton and Wyplosz (2001). They give a detailed account of transparency at
the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England and
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, but do not provide objective criteria to measure the degree
of transparency.
In their comprehensive survey of 94 central banks, Fry, Julius, Mahadeva, Roger and Sterne
(2000) construct an index of ‘policy explanations’ that consists of three components: (i) ex-
planations of policy decisions, (ii) explanations in forecasts and forward-looking analysis, and
(iii) explanations in published assessments and research. Their index captures many trans-
parency issues, but does not highlight the role that different kinds of transparency play in the
decision-making process. In addition, their index is constructed using survey responses from
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central banks, whereas our results stem from an objective, independent analysis of information
disclosure practices.
In addition, Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2001) present an indicator of central bank transparency
and accountability for six major central banks that captures four components: objectives, strat-
egy, publication of data and forecasts, and communication strategy.1 The latter captures di-
versity in the medium of information disclosure, regardless of how informative the disclosures
are. In contrast, our transparency index focuses solely on the contents of information disclo-
sure, systematically captures all stages of the policymaking process, and is based on criteria
whose relevance is illustrated by a simple theoretical framework.
Last but not least, we are the first to provide a central bank transparency index for several
years (1998-2002). It reveals that transparency has changed a lot for several central banks. We
show that it is important to take this into account in cross-section empirical analyses of the
effects of transparency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses a conceptual frame-
work for transparency. Subsequently, we review the theoretical literature on the desirability of
central bank transparency in section 3. Then, we present the main contribution of this paper, an
index of central bank transparency, in section 4, and discuss how transparent central banks are
in section 5. In section 6 we provide some empirical evidence that suggests that the distinction
between aspects of transparency matters because they appear to have different consequences
for economic performance. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework For Transparency
Transparency of monetary policy can be defined as the extent to which central banks disclose
information that is related to the policymaking process. It is a multifaceted concept that could
pertain to any aspect of economic policy-making. Thus, it seems natural to use a conceptual
framework for transparency that reflects the different stages of the decision-making process.
Following Geraats (2000), one can distinguish five aspects of transparency: political, eco-
nomic, procedural, policy and operational transparency. Each of these aspects may give rise
to different motives for transparency. Their relationship to the policy process is illustrated in
figure 1.2
• Political transparency refers to openness about policy objectives. This comprises a
statement of the formal objectives of monetary policy, including an explicit prioritization
1de Haan and Amtenbrink (2002) suggest a variation on this index. In addition, de Haan, Amtenbrink and
Eijffinger (1999) provide an index of central bank accountability that includes some elements that pertain to
transparency.
2This conceptual framework for transparency could also be applied to other forms of economic policy-making,
or decision-making more generally.
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Figure 1: A conceptual framework for transparency.
in case of potentially conflicting goals, and quantitative targets. Political transparency
is enhanced by institutional arrangements, like central bank independence, central bank
contracts and explicit override mechanisms, because they ensure that there is no undue
influence or political pressure to deviate from stated objectives.3
• Economic transparency focuses on the economic information that is used for mone-
tary policy. This includes the economic data the central bank uses, the policy models
it employs to construct economic forecasts or evaluate the impact of its decisions, and
the internal forecasts the central bank relies on. The latter are particularly important
since monetary policy actions are known to take effect only after substantial lags. So,
the central bank’s actions are likely to reflect anticipated developments.
• Procedural transparency is about the way monetary policy decisions are taken. It in-
volves an explicit monetary policy rule or strategy that describes the monetary policy
framework, and an account of the actual policy deliberations and how the policy deci-
sion was reached, which is achieved by the release of minutes and voting records.
• Policy transparency means a prompt announcement of policy decisions. In addition, it
includes an explanation of the decision and a policy inclination or indication of likely
future policy actions. The latter is relevant because monetary policy actions are typically
made in discrete steps; a central bank may be inclined to change the policy instrument,
but decide to wait until further evidence warrants moving a full step.
• Operational transparency concerns the implementation of the central bank’s policy
actions. It involves a discussion of control errors in achieving the operating targets of
monetary policy and (unanticipated) macroeconomic disturbances that affect the trans-
mission of monetary policy.4
3Note that political transparency need not be under control of the central bank, but is often determined by
political authorities (government or legislature). For instance, Anglo-Saxon central banks typically do not have
goal independence and lack the ability to set their own quantitative targets.
4Another kind of operational transparency that could potentially be considered is the publication of money
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The index for central bank transparency presented in section 4 attempts to quantify each
of these five aspects. We focus on the objective information disclosed by central banks, rather
than the subjective ways in which the private sector interprets and incorporates this information.
Also note that the concept of transparency is closely related to accountability. In fact, some
degree of transparency is a necessary condition for accountability. Conceptually, transparency
refers to mere information disclosure, whereas accountability concerns the explanation of one’s
actions and bearing responsibility for them, including possible repercussions when the policy
outcomes fall short of the objectives.
3 Is Central Bank Transparency Desirable?
Although there seems to be an unambiguous trend towards greater transparency in monetary
policy, the theoretical literature on the desirability of central bank transparency is still equiv-
ocal. It is useful to interpret the theoretical findings in the context of a canonical model and
distinguish between the different aspects of transparency.
Consider a monetary policy game in which the central bank has the objective function
W = α (pi − pi∗)2 + β (y − y∗)2 (1)
where pi is inflation and y is output. An important component of political transparency is
the publication of the inflation target pi∗.5 In addition, institutional arrangements also matter
because they clarify the motives of monetary policymakers. In particular, central bank inde-
pendence ensures that central bankers can pursue (1) without political influence, and incentive
schemes effectively modify their objective function (1).
The structure of the economy could be represented by the aggregate demand and supply
equations
y = y¯ − a (i− pie − r¯) + d (2)
pi = pie + b (y − y¯) + s (3)
where i is the nominal interest rate and pie denote inflation expectations.6 The natural rate of
output is y¯ and the long-run real interest rate equals r¯. In addition, there are aggregate demand
shocks d and aggregate supply shocks s. Economic transparency means that the private sector
market interventions that are made to implement policy decisions. However, this issue of market transparency is
not included in our transparency index which focuses more on macroeconomic aspects.
5Perfect political transparency would require that the output target y∗, relative preferences α/β and the func-
tional form of the objective function are also known to the private sector, but in practice, no central banks are
transparent in this respect. See Cukierman (2001b) for a discussion and potential explanation.
6The structure of the economy determines the transmission mechanism. Cukierman (2001b) provides a
comparison of three popular models: neo-monetarist Lucas-type transmission, the neo-Keynesian model with
backward-looking pricing, and the new-Keynesian model with forward-looking pricing.
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has the same knowledge about the economy as the central bank. This includes both the structure
of the economy and the part of the disturbances d and s that are anticipated by the central bank
and reflected in its actions.
Assume that the central bank controls the nominal interest rate i. The central bank could set
its policy instrument using a Taylor-type instrument rule, or it could maximize (1) subject to
(2) and (3), adopting a Svensson (2002) style targeting framework that allows for judgement.
Alternatively, the central bank could use different procedures and formulate its own monetary
policy strategy. In the case of procedural transparency, the central bank’s strategy and other
procedural aspects like minutes and voting records are shared with the private sector.
Policy transparency means that the central bank promptly announces the outcome of its
proceedings, in this case the decision about the policy instrument i.
Finally, the implementation of monetary policy could be complicated by control errors per-
taining to the policy instrument, or transmission disturbances in the form of unanticipated ag-
gregate demand and supply shocks d and s. Operational transparency means that these control
errors and transmission disturbances are communicated to the public.
This stylized model shows that all the five aspects of our transparency index can be distin-
guished in this general theoretical framework and that each is required for an adequate formal
description of monetary policy. This simple model is also convenient to briefly summarize the
main findings of the theoretical literature on central bank transparency.7
Political Transparency
Formal objectives, quantitative targets and explicit institutional arrangements all reduce un-
certainty about policymakers’ objectives, which tends to be beneficial.8 Greater transparency
about the inflation target pi∗ could also affect the incentives of central bankers. In the presence
of an inflation bias (y∗ > y¯) this could involve either a beneficial (direct) effect by inducing
additional losses to monetary policymakers when the target is missed (Walsh 1999), or a detri-
mental (indirect) effect by decreasing the payoff to reputation building under economic opacity
(Geraats 2000).
Central bank independence is often represented as the appointment of ‘conservative’ central
bankers that attach a greater weight to inflation stabilization α than socially optimal, which
reduces the inflation bias albeit at the cost of greater output fluctuations (Rogoff 1985). The
latter side-effect could be overcome by appointing central bankers with a conservative inflation
target pi∗ (Svensson 1997), or ‘responsible’ central bankers that do not attempt to stimulate
output beyond the natural rate so that y∗ = y¯ (Blinder 1997). Central bank contracts could also
7For a comprehensive survey, see Geraats (2002). In addition, there are some interesting informal discussions
of central bank transparency, including Goodfriend (1986) and Winkler (2000).
8Exceptions are suggested by Nolan and Schaling (1996) and Eijffinger, Hoeberichts and Schaling (2000), but
their results are sensitive to the specification of relative preference uncertainty, as Beetsma and Jensen (2001)
point out. Another exception is provided by Sørensen (1991), who assumes strategic union behavior.
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eliminate the inflation bias without compromising output stabilization (Walsh 1995). However,
when there is uncertainty about the central bank’s preferences, Beetsma and Jensen (1998) and
Muscatelli (1998) find that optimal inflation targets and contracts may again involve a trade-off
between credibility, in the form of a reduction of the inflation bias, and flexibility to stabilize
output in response to supply shocks.
Economic Transparency
Most of the literature on economic transparency focuses on the disclosure of economic shocks
(d, s) and/or central bank forecasts. When there is (mutual) uncertainty about expectations
of the private sector and the central bank, Tarkka and Mayes (1999) argue that the release of
central bank forecasts could help and make monetary policy more predictable. Furthermore,
Geraats (2000) shows that the publication of central bank forecasts reduces the inflation bias
and facilitates reputation building when there exists uncertainty about the preferences of the
central bank. It also provides the central bank greater flexibility to stabilize economic shocks.
She finds that inflation forecasts typically do not suffice to reap these benefits; central bank
forecasts for both inflation pi and output y are needed to identify d and s and achieve economic
transparency. In addition, similar benefits could be obtained when the central bank releases the
economic model(s) it uses for policy analysis.
On the other hand, when there is no preference uncertainty, Gersbach (1998) and Cukier-
man (2001a) show that the premature disclosure of supply shocks s could hamper their sta-
bilization in case of a neo-monetarist Lucas-type transmission mechanism. Jensen (2000)
also finds a negative stabilization effect using a New-Keynesian Phillips curve and assum-
ing preference uncertainty. Another reason against economic transparency is that it could lead
to greater political pressures when the central bank lacks independence or a clear political
mandate (Geraats 2001).
Procedural Transparency
The only formal models that analyze procedural transparency pertain to the release of indi-
vidual voting records when central bankers face reelection. Gersbach and Hahn (2001b) show
that voting transparency is beneficial when central bankers’ preferences may differ from the
socially optimal objectives. On the other hand, Gersbach and Hahn (2001a) argue that the
disclosure of attributed voting records could be harmful when central bankers differ in their
degree of competency. However, this result relies on the debatable feature that central bankers
abstain from voting under secrecy, but perturb the decision by random votes to get reelected
under transparency.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no models on the desirability of an explicit mone-
tary policy strategy or the publication of minutes. In defence of the latter, Buiter (1999, p. 194)
strongly argues in favor of a “culture of openness and accountability” such that “all informa-
tion is automatically in the public domain, unless there are overriding public interest reasons
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for not releasing a particular item”. In this light, he promotes the release of non-attributed
minutes since attributed, verbatim transcripts are likely to discourage open discussion during
the monetary policy meetings.
Policy Transparency
There are several papers that analyze the effects of the announcement of policy decisions,
but they all focus on (nonborrowed) reserves targeting, which has largely been abandoned by
central banks.9 The consequences of a prompt disclosure of interest rate decisions, policy
explanations and policy inclinations have not been formally modeled.
Operational Transparency
An influential precursor to the transparency literature is the paper by Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986) on the optimal degree of ambiguity in monetary policy through control errors when the
central bank’s preferences are uncertain and change over time. Faust and Svensson (2001) ex-
tend their model and distinguish between imperfect monetary control and (operational) trans-
parency. Their simulations reveal that operational transparency tends to reduce the inflation
bias and improve social welfare. On the other hand, when the degree of transparency is a
choice variable for the central bank, Faust and Svensson (2000) argue that minimum trans-
parency is likely to occur in practice. In addition, Jensen (2001) finds that greater operational
transparency could be beneficial when central banks suffer from low credibility, but that it
limits the ability to stabilize economic disturbances in the case of a new-Keynesian Phillips
curve.
This overview of the theoretical literature shows that the effects of transparency are by no
means unambiguous. This suggests an important role for empirical analysis, which requires
data on central bank transparency like the index we now describe further.
4 Index for Central Bank Transparency
The degree of central bank transparency could be measured by analyzing formal disclosure
requirements or actual disclosure practices. This paper pursues the latter approach because
the actual practice of central banks tends to go far beyond legal requirements. We present
an index that captures the degree of transparency for the five aspects discussed in section 2:
political, economic, procedural, policy and operational transparency. There is a subindex for
each aspect, based on three questions that each have equal weight and a maximum score of
one. A comprehensive measure of transparency is obtained by the sum of the five subindexes,
9One exception is the Bank of Japan, which has temporarily adopted a monetary operating target with its
policy rate at zero.
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so it has a maximum score of fifteen. A detailed description of our index for central bank
transparency is in the Appendix.
The index is constructed for nine major central banks: the Reserve Bank of Australia
(RBA), the Bank of Canada (BoC), the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of Japan
(BoJ), the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), the Swedish Riksbank (SRB), the Swiss
National Bank (SNB), the Bank of England (BoE), and the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed). Re-
source constraints forced us to consider only a limited number of central banks. We chose
the eight central banks that are most important in international financial markets, measured
in terms of foreign exchange market turnover of their currencies in April 2001. In addition,
we included the Reserve Bank of New Zealand because of its pioneering role in central bank
transparency starting in 1989.
Our methodology was as follows. First, we sifted through all information published by
central banks and other relevant government sources, that was freely available in English as of
June 2001. Second, for each central bank, we sent the scores we had obtained for that central
bank together with the detailed description of the transparency index to a senior official at that
central bank (chief economist, or comparable) with the request to review the scores.10 Third,
we used the responses to reassess our scores and made a few modifications.11 Later on, we
updated the index for 2002 and went back to 1998. This methodology is very time-consuming,
but it has the advantage that it combines an independent scrutiny of information sources with
the expert feedback from central banks, leading to accurate and objective scores.12
The detailed transparency scores for 2001 are presented in Table 1.13 In addition, Tables
2-4 show the 1998 index, the average 1998-2002 index, and the 1998-2002 increase in the
transparency index for each central bank. The results are first briefly discussed by aspect
before we turn to an analysis of transparency by central bank in section 5.
4.1 Political Transparency
All central banks in our sample have formal objectives for monetary policy (1.a). However,
Japan, Switzerland, the United States (and Sweden in 1998) do not achieve the full score of
one on this item because they have multiple objectives without a prioritization. The latter is
important because objectives can be conflicting. The other central banks identify price stability
10All central banks responded. Interestingly, all suggested their overall score should be higher, and three central
banks argued they deserved the maximum score!
11We adjusted only 4 out of 135 scores, three of which concerned item 2.a for which publicly available infor-
mation in English appeared hard to find for Japan, Sweden and Switzerland. In addition, we found information
relevant for item 5.a at a regional U.S. Federal Reserve Bank.
12The importance of an independent analysis is evident from the fact that every central bank awarded itself
higher transparency scores than it deserved.
13The detailed information and sources used to construct all transparency scores are available in the Supple-
mentary Data.
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as their main objective.
The specification of a quantitative target for the main objective(s) of monetary policy (1.b)
is popular. Only the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve do not have one. All other central
banks in our sample have a quantitative target for inflation, in Switzerland only since December
1999. This target could be set by the central bank (ECB, SRB, SNB), the government (BoE),
or be based on a joint agreement (RBA, BoC, RBNZ).
Even more prevalent are institutional arrangements between the monetary authorities and
the government (1.c), mostly in the form of explicit instrument independence. For several
central banks (RBA, BoC, RBZN, BoE) independence is subject to an explicit override proce-
dure. Although it is sometimes argued that this reduces central bank independence, it greatly
enhances transparency about the institutional setting. The United States (and initially also Swe-
den and Switzerland) do not enjoy formal instrument independence, so they are not awarded
the full score of one.14
Many central banks now get the maximum score of three on political transparency, in-
cluding the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Bank of Canada, the European Central Bank, the
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Riksbank and the Bank of England. These are all central
banks that have adopted ‘inflation targeting’, with the exception of the ECB. A particularly
interesting case is New Zealand, which clarifies institutional arrangements in the form of a
central bank contract (Policy Targets Agreement). It even allows the government to fire the
Reserve Bank Governor if the inflation target is not met.
4.2 Economic Transparency
The economic information that is used for monetary policy includes timely economic data
(2.a). We looked for quarterly time-series of variables that the academic literature considers
important for monetary policy: money supply, inflation, GDP, unemployment rate and capacity
utilization. The most common reason for not getting the full score is that data on capacity
utilization is not publicly available.15
To interpret the central bank’s policy actions it is important to know what kind of policy
models it employs (2.b). An increasing number of central banks has published a structural
macroeconomic model that is used for policy analysis; only Japan, Sweden and Switzerland
remain deficient in this respect.
All central banks release numerical internal forecasts for inflation and/or output (2.c).
However, only the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Riksbank and the Bank of England
14Nevertheless, the Fed is often thought to enjoy effective independence from the government and Congress.
Although this is not based on formal instrument independence, it could be induced by the anticipation of negative
reactions from Wall Street if the Fed is put under political pressure.
15Interestingly, a few central banks claimed they do not use any measures of capacity utilization, which is
surprising given the prominence of the output gap in theoretical models.
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publish medium term forecasts for both inflation and output at quarterly frequency and specify
the underlying assumptions about the policy instrument, which we require for the maximum
score.16 This is motivated by the fact that inflation and output tend to be the key variables
in the determination of monetary policy and can only be affected in the medium term (one to
two years ahead). In addition, the availability of quarterly data for most macroeconomic data
suggests that quarterly updates of forecasts are appropriate.
There has been a notable increase in economic transparency over time (from an average of
1.7 in 1998 to 2.3 in 2002). Only two central banks attain the maximum score of 3 on economic
transparency, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Bank of England. The latter deserves
special mention; it provides extensive documentation on its economic models, including the
computer code for its macroeconometric model. Furthermore, the Bank of England was the
first central bank to introduce colorful fan charts for its internal forecasts of inflation and output,
which has set an example for several other central banks.
4.3 Procedural Transparency
Most of the central banks in our sample provide a description of their monetary policy frame-
work in the form of an explicit monetary policy strategy (3.a). Typically, the strategy is some
form of inflation targeting, although the ECB’s “two pillar strategy” is a notable exception.
Only the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve do not have an explicit monetary policy frame-
work.
Several central banks, in particular the Bank of Japan, the Riksbank, the Bank of England
and the Federal Reserve, release a comprehensive account of policy deliberations within a rea-
sonable amount of time (eight weeks) in the form of minutes (3.b) that also include a discussion
of the forward-looking arguments that are so critical for monetary policy.
These central banks are also the ones that publish individual voting records (3.c).17
Three central banks score full marks on procedural transparency, the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand, the Riksbank and the Bank of England. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand is special
in the sense that its policy decisions are solely made by its Governor. This means that voting
records are immaterial. In addition, minutes are substituted by comprehensive explanations
of its decisions, including forward-looking analysis. Although decision-making by committee
makes it harder to achieve procedural transparency, the Riksbank and the Bank of England
16We do not discriminate between conditional and unconditional forecasts, although we recognize that they
may serve different purposes in terms of communication strategy. In addition, we acknowledge that inflation and
output forecasts are suitable for transparency of central banks that adopt an interest rate as the policy instrument,
but do not suffice for central banks that use the money supply as instrument.
17A few central banks told us they decide ‘by consensus’. However, this term is ambiguous and need not
mean unanimity. In fact, decision making by unanimity would be at odds with legal requirements which typically
stipulate decisions be taken by majority voting.
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show that this need not be an insurmountable problem.
4.4 Policy Transparency
All central banks make a prompt announcement of their policy decisions (4.a); their operating
instrument or target is a short-term nominal interest rate, with the Bank of Japan currently being
the only exception. However, there has not always been openness about policy decisions. The
Federal Reserve, for instance, only adopted this practice in 1994.
In addition, most central banks provide an explanation when they announce their policy
decisions (4.b). The Reserve Bank of Australia, the Bank of Japan and the Bank of England
do not get the full score because they do not give an explanation after all policy decisions,
although they do provide one whenever policy decisions change.
The publication of a policy inclination or indication of likely future policy actions (4.c) is
unusual. The Federal Reserve includes a statement in its policy announcements that reflects its
policy tilt, but only since May 1999. The Riksbank also provides a policy inclination, but only
since May 2002. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand adopts a different approach and provides
short-run quarterly forecasts of short-term nominal interest rates, which essentially convey its
likely future policy actions. These three central banks get full marks on policy transparency.18
And the clear increase in the average score on policy transparency (from 1.6 in 1998 to 2.2 in
2002) is mainly the result of significant improvements by these central banks.
4.5 Operational Transparency
The implementation of monetary policy could be complicated by two kinds of disturbances,
control errors in achieving operating targets (5.a) and unanticipated macroeconomic distur-
bances that affect the transmission of monetary policy. Most central banks in our sample ac-
count for significant deviations from the operating target (if any), or have (nearly) perfect con-
trol over their main operating instrument or target. The only exceptions are the Bank of Japan
and the Swiss National Bank. The Bank of Japan has an operating target for the outstanding
balance of current accounts at the Bank (since March 2001), whereas the Swiss National Bank
has an operating range of 100 basis points for the three-month LIBOR rate (since December
1999). Both fall short because they do not provide explanations for significant fluctuations,
thereby getting a score of one-half.
Most central banks regularly publish an analysis of current macroeconomic developments
or short-term forecasts, which implicitly provide information on transmission disturbances
(5.b). Nevertheless, two central banks get a score of zero: the Federal Reserve releases its
18A few central banks suggested that the risks to forecasts they publish indicate a policy inclination. However,
it is not straightforward to map risks to inflation and output forecasts into a policy tilt, especially when they go in
opposite directions.
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short-run forecasts and macroeconomic analysis only semiannually; and the Swiss National
Bank only has a brief abstract of macroeconomic analysis in English. The Riksbank and the
Bank of England both obtain the full score as they explain the importance of unanticipated
factors by providing an annual discussion of past forecast errors.
Finally, we consider whether central banks regularly provide an evaluation of the policy
outcome in light of macroeconomic objectives (5.c). Most central banks have some kind of
evaluation without accounting for the role of monetary policy. The Reserve Bank of Aus-
tralia and the Swiss National Bank are exceptions in the sense that they do not have a regular
evaluation. On the other hand, the Riksbank sets a positive example with its explicit annual
evaluation in which it discusses the contribution of monetary policy in meeting the objectives,
thereby earning the maximum score.
All in all, the Riksbank is the only central bank to achieve full marks on operational trans-
parency. Perhaps, it could be a source of inspiration for other central banks, since the scores
on operational transparency vary a lot, with the Swiss National Bank getting the lowest score
(0.5) for any of the five aspects.
The comprehensive index that consists of the sum of the subscores for each of the five
aspects reveals which central banks are the most transparent. In 1998, the most transparent
central banks were the Bank of England (11 out of 15), the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and
the Bank of Canada (both 10.5), followed by the Swedish Riksbank (9), the Federal Reserve
(8.5), the Reserve Bank of Australia and Japan (both 8) and Switzerland (6). In 2002, average
transparency had increased from 8.9 to 10.7, with major improvements in economic and policy
transparency. The top league of central bank transparency now consists of the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand, the Riksbank (both 14) and the Bank of England (13). The subtop is formed
by the Bank of Canada, the European Central Bank (both 10.5) and the Federal Reserve (10).
The Reserve Bank of Australia (9), the Bank of Japan (8) and the Swiss National Bank (7.5)
appear to be the least transparent central banks in our sample.
Table 4 shows that most of the increase in average transparency from 1998 to 2002 can
be attributed to improvements in economic transparency by many central banks and large in-
creases in policy transparency by a few central banks. This illustrates the usefulness of distin-
guishing between various aspects of transparency.
5 How Transparent Are Central Banks?
The previous section provided an analysis of each aspect of transparency across central banks.
This section complements that view with a description of transparency across all aspects for
each central bank.
Reserve Bank of Australia
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Although the Reserve Bank of Australia has adopted inflation targeting, it gets one of the low-
est transparency scores (8, increasing to 9 in 2002) in our sample. The fact that the RBA is
an inflation targeter is reflected in the maximum score (3) on political transparency. It has
an inflation target of 2-3% and enjoys instrument independence subject to an explicit override
mechanism. However, its openness on other aspects is much less. With an initial score of only
1 on economic transparency it misses two points for several reasons: it does not publish quar-
terly data on capacity utilization, and it only provides rough short term forecasts for inflation
(quarterly) and output (semiannually). In addition, initially there was no explicit policy model
but this has improved in October 2001 so that RBA gains 1 point19. On procedural transparency
the RBA scores only 1 because it does not release minutes and voting records. Its score for
policy transparency (1.5) reflects the lack of an explicit policy inclination and the fact that it
only provides an explanation of decisions when policy changes. Regarding operational trans-
parency, the RBA misses 1.5 points because the information on transmission disturbances does
not include a discussion of past forecast errors, and because there is no evaluation of the policy
outcome in light of its macroeconomic objectives.
The Reserve Bank of Australia shows that inflation targeting does not guarantee trans-
parency in all aspects.
Bank of Canada
The Bank of Canada, another inflation targeter, secures a place in the subtop with a score of
10.5. It earns the full score (3) on political transparency, with an explicit inflation target of
1-3% and instrument independence subject to an explicit override mechanism. On economic
transparency the BoC achieves a respectable score of 2.5 points, missing 0.5 points because
it only publishes rough projections for inflation and output. On procedural transparency, the
BoC gets only 1 point because it does not disclose minutes and voting records. Concerning
policy transparency it receives 2 points and just misses 1 point because it does not give an
explicit indication of likely future policy actions. On operational transparency the BoC also
receives 2 points. It misses credit for not discussing past forecast errors. In addition, although
it publishes a graphical evaluation of the inflation outcome, it does not explicitly account for
deviations from the target.
All in all, the Bank of Canada performs quite well, although its displays some weakness in
procedural transparency.
European Central Bank
Starting of with a low score of 8.5, the European Central Bank has significantly improved its
transparency and now belongs to the subtop with a score of 10.5. Although it is not an infla-
tion targeter, it achieves the maximum score (3) on political transparency. It has a quantitative
19Although a structural macroeconomic model appears in one of its Research Discussion Papers (2000-05), it
was not made clear until October 2001 that the Bank uses it for policy analysis.
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definition of price stability of 0-2% inflation and its independence is firmly enshrined in an
international treaty. For economic transparency the ECB now earns high marks (2.5). This is
entirely due to recent developments. In January 2001 it disclosed its structural macroeconomic
model of the euro area, and since December 2000 it has published its semiannual medium term
conditional projections for inflation and output. The ECB emphasizes that these projections are
made by ECB staff and not binding for the ECB Governing Council.20 On procedural trans-
parency the ECB gets only 1 point because it does not provide comprehensive minutes and
actual voting records. Concerning policy transparency, the ECB has improved a bit and now
provides an explanation of the policy decision at a press conference after each monetary policy
meeting. The current score of 2 reflects the lack of an explicit policy inclination. On opera-
tional transparency the ECB also misses 1 point. The reason is that the ECB provides some
information on unanticipated macroeconomic disturbances that affect the policy transmission
through macroeconomic analysis in its Monthly Bulletin, but it does not (yet?) discuss past
forecast errors. In addition, the ECB provides an informal evaluation of the policy outcomes in
its Monthly Bulletin and Annual Report, but it does not explicitly account for the contributions
of monetary policy.
In its early years of existence, the European Central Bank has already achieved quite some
transparency in several respects, but it could use some improvement on procedural and policy
transparency.21
Bank of Japan
The Bank of Japan has one of the lowest transparency scores (8) in our sample. It only gets 1.5
points for political transparency because it has multiple objectives of monetary policy without
explicit prioritization, and no precise definition or quantification of its objectives. On eco-
nomic transparency the BoJ has shown some improvement and now scores 1.5 points. It does
not disclose a formal macroeconomic model for policy analysis. But since October 2000 it has
published its forecasts for inflation and output, although only at semiannual frequency. Re-
garding procedural transparency, the BoJ does quite well with 2 points. It publishes elaborate
minutes in a timely fashion, including individual voting records, and only misses 1 point be-
cause it lacks an explicit monetary policy strategy. On policy transparency the BoJ only scores
1.5 points. The reason is that it just provides an explanation of its policy decisions in case
of a change and does not disclose an explicit policy inclination. On operational transparency
the BoJ has dropped a bit to 1.5 points and misses some points on all counts. After changing
20It should be mentioned that the publication of projections has been triggered by the Committee on Economic
and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament in its quarterly Monetary Dialogue with the ECB based on
Article 113(3) of the Treaty on European Union and on the advice of its Panel of Experts in their quarterly
Briefing Paper.
21This also sheds light on the debate on ECB transparency between Buiter (1999) and Issing (1999), which is
discussed by de Haan and Eijffinger (2000).
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the main operating target to the outstanding balance of current accounts at the Bank in March
2001, there have been significant fluctuations without explanations for it.22 Also, the BoJ gives
information on macroeconomic disturbances through a monthly analysis of the current macroe-
conomic situation, but not (yet?) through a discussion of past forecast errors. Finally, it does
not account for deviations between the policy outcomes and the objectives.
The Bank of Japan has recently shown some change in transparency, but it still falls short
in several respects, most noticeably political and policy transparency.
Reserve Bank of New Zealand
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand, which has been one of the most transparent central banks
throughout our sample, started off with a respectable score of 10.5 in 1998, zoomed ahead
to 13 in 1999 and subsequently rose to 14 points. It is an inflation targeter, with an inflation
target of 0-3% and instrument independence subject to an explicit override mechanism, earning
the full score (3) on political transparency. For economic and procedural transparency, it also
achieves the maximum score (3), but for the former only since 2002 when quarterly data for
capacity utilization has become available. Regarding policy and operational transparency, the
RBNZ accomplished an impressive increase (from 1 to 2.5 and 1 to 2, respectively) in March
1999 when it adjusted its monetary policy operating procedures. In particular, it changed its
formal policy instrument from the daily settlement cash target, which had not been adjusted
for a long time and was hardly mentioned in RBNZ communications, to the Official Cash
Rate.23 Concerning operational transparency, the RBNZ misses credit because it does not
provide a discussion of past forecast errors or evaluate how monetary policy contributed to
policy outcomes.
The performance of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand on transparency is outstanding,
although improvement is still feasible on operational transparency.
Swedish Riksbank
The Swedish Riksbank has achieved the largest increase in transparency in our sample. Starting
with a modest score of 9 in 1998, it has soared to 14, sharing the top spot with New Zealand. It
is also an inflation targeter with a maximum score on political transparency. It has an inflation
target of 2% and enjoys formal independence. On economic transparency the SRB misses
1 point because it does not disclose a formal macroeconomic model that is used for policy
analysis. Regarding procedural transparency, the SRB has recently reached the maximum score
22Previously, the BoJ had a main operating target for the uncollateralized overnight call rate, with the rate at
essentially zero since February 1999.
23Instead of focusing on the formal policy instrument, from December 1996 to March 1999 the monetary policy
stance was essentially conveyed in terms of a target for the Monetary Conditions Index (MCI), which is a weighted
average of the trade-weighted exchange rate and the 90-day interest rate. In terms of this (intermediate) policy
target, policy and operational transparency in 1998 were much better (3 and 2, respectively).
15
(3), releasing both minutes and voting records.24 On policy transparency, the SRB also recently
achieved the full score (3) after it started providing an explicit policy tilt. For operational
transparency the Riksbank is the only central bank to gain full marks; since 1999, it provides
an annual evaluation of the inflation outcome over the last three years, including a discussion
of the role of monetary policy.
The Swedish Riksbank has accomplished an impressive improvement in transparency. It at-
tains perfect scores on all aspects except for economic transparency where it falls short because
it does not publish a policy model.
Swiss National Bank
The Swiss National Bank receives the lowest transparency score in our sample with 7.5 points.
Regarding political transparency, it improved significantly in 2000 (from 1 to 2.5), when its in-
dependence was enshrined in the constitution and it specified a quantitative definition of price
stability of inflation below 2%. But it still has multiple objectives without an explicit priori-
tization. On economic transparency the SNB scores 1.5 points. It does not disclose a formal
policy model, but since 1999 it has published a three-year forecast for inflation at semian-
nual frequency. On procedural transparency the SNB receives only 1 point because it releases
neither minutes nor voting records. Concerning policy transparency the SNB misses 1 point
because it does not provide an explicit policy inclination. On operational transparency the SNB
currently has a score of only 0.5 points. Since December 1999 it has had an operational target
range for the LIBOR of 100 basis points, but it does not provide an explanation for significant
fluctuations within that range. Although it provides an elaborate analysis of macroeconomic
developments, only a brief abstract is available in English.25 Finally, the SNB gives merely
a review of the year, and it does not account for discrepancies between policy outcome and
target.
The Swiss National Bank performs poorly on transparency when compared to the other
central banks in our sample. There is a lot of scope for improvement, especially on economic
and operational transparency.
Bank of England
The Bank of England started off as the most transparent central bank in our sample (with 11
points) and its subsequent improvements (to 13) have kept it in the top league. It is an inflation
targeter with full marks for political transparency; it has an inflation target of 2.5% and since
1998, instrument independence subject to an explicit override mechanism. It now attains the
maximum score (3) for both economic transparency and procedural transparency. For policy
transparency it only receives 1.5 points. The reason is that it only provides an explanation of
24In May 2002, the Riksbank clarified that the attributed reservations against the decision included in the
minutes correspond to the only dissents, so that effectively individual voting records are available.
25If information were not restricted to be in English, the SNB would gain 0.5 point on item 5.b.
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changes in policy decisions at the time of announcement, but not when it is decided not to adjust
the policy instrument. In addition, the BoE does not provide an explicit policy inclination. On
operational transparency the BoE scores very high (2.5) and only misses 0.5 points because
there is no evaluation of its policy outcomes that accounts for the contribution of monetary
policy.
The Bank of England is very transparent and has been used as an example by many other
central banks. Nevertheless, there is still scope for significant improvement on policy trans-
parency.
Federal Reserve System
The total score for the Federal Reserve is 10, securing a place in the subtop. For political trans-
parency it only receives 1 point. It has multiple objectives without an explicit prioritization.
Also, there is no quantification of its objectives for monetary policy. Finally, the Federal Re-
serve has no explicit, formal instrument independence. On economic transparency the Fed does
very well with a score of 2.5, missing 0.5 points because it only publishes short-term economic
projections for inflation and output at a semiannual frequency. Concerning procedural trans-
parency, the Fed gets 2 points because it does not have an explicit policy strategy that describes
its monetary policy framework. For policy transparency the Fed has earned full marks (3) since
May 1999 when it started to provide an explanation and policy inclination with every policy
decision. Its score for operational transparency is only 1.5. The Fed only provides a macroe-
conomic analysis and short-term forecasts for inflation and output at semiannual frequency. In
addition, it provides only an informal evaluation of policy outcomes.
The Federal Reserve has great strength in policy transparency, but displays noticeable
weakness in political transparency.
6 Does Central Bank Transparency Matter?
This description of the degree of transparency of central banks prompts the question whether
transparency actually matters for economic performance. Demertzis and Hughes Hallett (2002)
address this issue using our transparency index for 2001 in Table 1, which circulated in an
earlier draft (Eijffinger and Geraats 2002). They regressed the mean and standard deviation
of inflation and the output gap, mostly computed using 1990-2001 quarterly data, on the 2001
transparency index. They find no significant effects for the average levels of inflation and the
output gap. But there is a significantly negative relationship between the variability of inflation
and (total, economic, procedural and operational) transparency, and a significantly positive
relationship between the variability of the output gap and operational transparency.
However, these relations between economic performance and end-of-period transparency
can be misleading to assess the effects of transparency. The reason is that the degree of trans-
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parency has changed considerably for several central banks as is shown in Table 4. This sug-
gests that it may be better to look at the relationship between economic performance and av-
erage transparency over the same period. We computed simple sample correlations between
average transparency and the mean µ and standard deviation σ of the output gap y, annual CPI
inflation pi, and the unemployment rate u, using quarterly data from 1998 to 2002. The corre-
lations ρ are reported in Table 5.a, with p-values in square brackets. Nearly all correlations are
insignificant, which is not surprising given the small sample of countries. Interestingly, trans-
parency now appears to be unrelated to the variability of inflation; operational transparency still
seems to be associated with a more variable output gap (and unemployment rate, with ρ = 0.53
[0.14] for both) but this effect is no longer significant. Only two results are statistically signifi-
cant: greater procedural transparency is associated with a lower output gap (ρ = −0.65 [0.06]),
and political transparency with a higher unemployment rate (ρ = 0.63 [0.07]).
To get a better idea whether these correlations capture the effect of transparency on sub-
sequent economic performance, we computed the correlations between the 1998 transparency
index and the 1998-2002 means and standard deviations of the output gap, inflation and the
unemployment rate, which are reported in Table 5.b. Many results are quite similar and again
insignificant. But there are some big changes, in particular for policy transparency, where the
correlation with the average output gap and unemployment variability goes from -0.06 to +0.67
and from +0.21 to -0.60, respectively. Procedural transparency still has a sizeable negative cor-
relation with the average output gap (ρ = −0.60 [0.11]), and the positive relation between
political transparency and average unemployment becomes even stronger (ρ = 0.86 [0.01]).
Total transparency now also shows a significant, positive relation with average unemployment
(ρ = 0.70 [0.05]). Furthermore, there appears to be a significant, positive correlation between
1998 political transparency and the subsequent variability of inflation (ρ = 0.64 [0.09]).
To assess whether any of the significant correlations are robust, we inspected scatter plots
and omitted any outlying observation in the computation of the coefficients. This left us with
only three significant effects: It appears that higher average political transparency is associated
with higher average unemployment, and that a greater level of political transparency in 1998
leads to more variable inflation and a higher average unemployment rate in the subsequent five
years.
It is important to be cautious when results are based on such a small sample of central
banks. Moreover, these correlations could be driven by other variables. For instance, the rela-
tively stable inflation in the US and Japan (with low political transparency) and the much more
variable inflation in Australia, New Zealand and Sweden (with high political transparency) may
be attributable to the degree of openness instead of transparency. In addition, the high average
unemployment rates in Canada, Australia and New Zealand may be due to their labor market
institutions and not their high degree of political transparency.
Nevertheless, two conclusions emerge from this empirical exercise. First, the distinction
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between aspects of transparency is useful because they give rise to different empirical effects.
Second, the choice of date or period for the transparency measure could have a dramatic impact
on the findings of cross-section empirical studies because of the dynamics in transparency.
7 Concluding Remarks
Our comprehensive analysis of central bank transparency gives rise to some interesting con-
clusions.
The most transparent central banks are the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Swedish
Riksbank and the Bank of England. The subtop is formed by the Bank of Canada, the European
Central Bank and the Federal Reserve. The least transparent central banks in our sample are
the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Bank of Japan and the Swiss National Bank.
Although the most transparent central banks in our sample are all inflation targeters, there
is remarkable variation in overall transparency among central banks that have adopted infla-
tion targeting. For instance, the Reserve Bank of Australia gets one of the lowest scores. It is
striking that inflation targeters all achieve the maximum score on political transparency, which
describes openness about objectives, quantitative targets and institutional arrangements. How-
ever, inflation targeting is not a necessary condition for political transparency, as is exemplified
by the European Central Bank.
It should be noted that our analysis of the various aspects of central bank transparency is
designed to be independent of the monetary policy framework and does not seem to be biased
towards inflation targeters, given the large variation within this category. In principle, other
monetary policy strategies, like monetary targeting or the ECB’s two-pillar strategy, could all
obtain the maximum score for any aspect of transparency.
Our analysis shows that central banks put different emphasis on the various aspects of
transparency. For instance, the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve both achieve
the same overall score on transparency in 2001. But the ECB has its strength in political
transparency, whereas the Fed excels in transparency about its policy decisions in the form of a
prompt announcement, explanation and policy inclination. Perhaps, this explains why financial
markets perceive the Fed as more transparent than the ECB.
In addition, we find that central bank transparency has an important dynamic aspect. The
scores for several central banks have increased significantly over time, especially for economic
and policy transparency, and most notably for the Riksbank. This suggests a general trend
towards greater central bank transparency.
We have explored the effect of transparency on economic performance. A simple correla-
tion analysis suggests that central banks with greater political transparency in 1998 tended to
experience more variable inflation and higher unemployment in the subsequent five years for
our small sample of central banks, but this result is probably driven by other variables such
as openness and labor market institutions. Furthermore, our analysis shows that cross-section
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empirical studies could yield misleading results due to the dynamics in transparency.
Last but not least, this paper provides an index of central bank transparency that systemat-
ically distinguishes between various aspects of transparency based on their role in the policy-
making process. Such a distinction is critical to assess to what extent central bank transparency
really matters.
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A Appendix
This appendix contains the exact formulation of the central bank transparency index. The index
is the sum of the scores for the answers to the fifteen questions below (min = 0, max = 15).
Note that all questions pertain to published information that is freely available in English.
1. Political Transparency
Political transparency refers to openness about policy objectives. This comprises a for-
mal statement of objectives, including an explicit prioritization in case of multiple goals,
a quantification of the primary objective(s), and explicit institutional arrangements.
(a) Is there a formal statement of the objective(s) of monetary policy, with an explicit
prioritization in case of multiple objectives?
No formal objective(s) = 0.
Multiple objectives without prioritization = 1/2.
One primary objective, or multiple objectives with explicit priority = 1.
(b) Is there a quantification of the primary objective(s)?
No = 0.
Yes = 1.
(c) Are there explicit institutional arrangements or contracts between the monetary au-
thorities and the government?
No central bank, contracts or other institutional arrangements = 0.
Central bank without explicit instrument independence or contract = 1/2.
Central bank with explicit instrument independence or central bank contract (al-
though possibly subject to an explicit override procedure) = 1.
2. Economic Transparency
Economic transparency focuses on the economic information that is used for monetary
policy. This includes economic data, the model of the economy that the central bank
employs to construct forecasts or evaluate the impact of its decisions, and the internal
forecasts (model based or judgmental) that the central bank relies on.
(a) Is the basic economic data relevant for the conduct of monetary policy publicly
available?
The focus is on the following five variables: money supply, inflation, GDP, unem-
ployment rate and capacity utilization.
Quarterly time series for at most two out of the five variables = 0.
Quarterly time series for three or four out of the five variables = 1/2.
Quarterly time series for all five variables = 1.
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(b) Does the central bank disclose the formal macroeconomic model(s) it uses for pol-
icy analysis?
No = 0.
Yes = 1.
(c) Does the central bank regularly publish its own macroeconomic forecasts?
No numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output = 0.
Numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and/or output published at less than
quarterly frequency = 1/2.
Quarterly numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output for the medium
term (one to two years ahead), specifying the assumptions about the policy instru-
ment (conditional or unconditional forecasts) = 1.
3. Procedural Transparency
Procedural transparency is about the way monetary policy decisions are taken. It in-
volves an explicit monetary policy rule or strategy that describes the monetary policy
framework, an account of policy deliberations and how the policy decision was reached.
(a) Does the central bank provide an explicit policy rule or strategy that describes its
monetary policy framework?
No = 0.
Yes = 1.
(b) Does the central bank give a comprehensive account of policy deliberations (or
explanations in case of a single central banker) within a reasonable amount of time?
No, or only after a substantial lag (more than eight weeks) = 0.
Yes, comprehensive minutes (although not necessarily verbatim or attributed) or ex-
planations (in case of a single central banker), including a discussion of backward-
and forward-looking arguments = 1.
(c) Does the central bank disclose how each decision on the level of its main operating
instrument or target was reached?
No voting records, or only after substantial lag (more than eight weeks) = 0.
Non-attributed voting records = 1/2.
Individual voting records, or decision by single central banker = 1.
4. Policy Transparency
Policy transparency means prompt disclosure of policy decisions. In addition, it includes
an explanation of the decision, and an explicit policy inclination or indication of likely
future policy actions.
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(a) Are decisions about adjustments to the main operating instrument or target promptly
announced?
No, or after a significant lag = 0.
Yes, at the latest on the day of implementation = 1.
(b) Does the central bank provide an explanation when it announces policy decisions?
No = 0.
Yes, when policy decisions change, or only superficially = 1/2.
Yes, always and including forwarding-looking assessments = 1.
(c) Does the central bank disclose an explicit policy inclination after every policy meet-
ing or an explicit indication of likely future policy actions (at least quarterly)?
No = 0.
Yes = 1.
5. Operational Transparency
Operational transparency concerns the implementation of the central bank’s policy ac-
tions. It involves a discussion of control errors in achieving operating targets and (unan-
ticipated) macroeconomic disturbances that affect the transmission of monetary policy.
Furthermore, the evaluation of the macroeconomic outcomes of monetary policy in light
of its objectives is included here as well.
(a) Does the central bank regularly evaluate to what extent its main policy operating
targets (if any) have been achieved?
No, or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0.
Yes, but without providing explanations for significant deviations = 1/2.
Yes, accounting for significant deviations from target (if any); or, (nearly) perfect
control over main operating instrument/target = 1.
(b) Does the central bank regularly provide information on (unanticipated) macroeco-
nomic disturbances that affect the policy transmission process?
No, or not very often = 0.
Yes, but only through short-term forecasts or analysis of current macroeconomic
developments (at least quarterly) = 1/2.
Yes, including a discussion of past forecast errors (at least annually) = 1.
(c) Does the central bank regularly provide an evaluation of the policy outcome in light
of its macroeconomic objectives?
No, or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0.
Yes, but superficially = 1/2.
Yes, with an explicit account of the contribution of monetary policy in meeting the
objectives = 1.
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B Supplementary Data
This supplement contains the detailed information and sources used to construct the scores
on the index of central bank transparency described in the Appendix for nine central banks
(Australia, Canada, Euro zone, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
United States) from 1998 to 2002. For each of the fifteen items of the index, the score for
June 1998 and subsequent changes (if any) are included in bold in square brackets. Nearly all
sources mentioned below are available from central banks’ web sites.
Reserve Bank of Australia (http://www.rba.gov.au)
1.a [1] Objectives: (a) the stability of the currency of Australia; (b) the maintenance of full em-
ployment in Australia; and (c) the economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia.
Reserve Bank Act 1959, Part II 10(2), Functions of Reserve Bank Board.
Prioritization: “These objectives allow the Reserve Bank to focus on price (currency) stability
while taking account of the implications of monetary policy for activity and, therefore, em-
ployment in the short term.” Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy, by the Treasurer
and the Reserve Bank Governor (designate), 14 August 1996.
1.b [1] “In pursuing the goal of medium term price stability the Reserve Bank has adopted
the objective of keeping underlying inflation between 2 and 3 per cent, on average, over the
cycle.” Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy, by the Treasurer and the Reserve Bank
Governor (designate), 14 August 1996.
1.c [1] Operational responsibility: Reserve Bank Act 1959, Part II 10(1).
Explicit override procedure: Reserve Bank Act 1959, Part II 11.
Instrument independence: “The Government recognises the independence of the Bank and
its responsibility for monetary policy matters and intends to respect the Bank’s independence
as provided by statute. Section 11 of the Reserve Bank Act prescribes procedures for the
resolution of policy differences between the Bank and the Government. The procedures, in
effect, allow the Government to determine policy in the event of a material difference; but
the procedures are politically demanding and their nature reinforces the Bank’s independence.
Safeguards like this ensure that monetary policy is subject to the checks and balances inherent
and necessary in a democratic system.” Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy, by the
Treasurer and the Reserve Bank Governor (designate), August 14, 1996.
2.a [0.5] Money, price, output and unemployment data are available from web site under Statis-
tics.
2.b [0 + 1 (10/2001)] Meredith Beechey, Nargis Bharucha, Adam Cagliarini, David Gruen,
Christopher Thompson, “A small model of the Australian macro economy”, Reserve Bank of
Australia Research Discussion Paper 2000-05, provide a macroeconomic model. However, it
was only in the speech “The Monetary Policy Process at the RBA” by Glenn Stevens, Assistant
Governor, Melbourne, October 10, 2001, that it was clarified that this is indeed used by the
Reserve Bank for policy analysis.
2.c [0.5] Since November 2000, the Reserve Bank publishes a quarterly Statement on Monetary
Policy (replacing the Semi-Annual Statement on Monetary Policy and the Quarterly Report on
the Economy and Financial Markets, published since 1997), which contains a rough short-term
inflation projection. In addition, the Opening Statement to House of Representatives Standing
Committee on Economics, Finance and Public Administration of the semi-annual testimony by
the Governor, which is held since 1997, contains a rough short-term output forecast.
3.a [1] The monetary policy framework of inflation targeting is outlined in the Statement on
the Conduct of Monetary Policy, by the Treasurer and the Reserve Bank Governor (designate),
14 August 1996.
See also http://www.rba.gov.au/MonetaryPolicy/about monetary policy.html
3.b [0] No minutes available.
3.c [0] No voting records available.
4.a [1] Changes in policy decision are usually announced the day after the policy meeting at
9:30am, when the policy implementation starts (at least since 1990).
4.b [0.5] Policy explanations including forward-looking assessments released together with
announcement of policy decision but only when policy changes (at least since 1990).
4.c [0] No explicit policy inclination.
27
5.a [1] Operating target for the cash rate (interest rate on overnight interbank loans in money
market). Since 1998, a graphical evaluation of the cash rate target in the annual Report and
Financial Statements, Operations in Financial Markets, shows nearly perfect control.
5.b [0.5] Analysis of macroeconomic developments and rough short-term inflation forecast in
quarterly Statement on Monetary Policy.
5.c [0] Policy outcome not compared to objectives. (However, implicit graphical evaluation of
inflation target since August 2001 Statement on Monetary Policy.)
Bank of Canada (http://www.bankofcanada.ca/)
1.a [1] Objectives: “to regulate credit and currency in the best interests of the economic life of
the nation, to control and protect the external value of the national monetary unit and to mitigate
by its influence fluctuations in the general level of production, trade, prices and employment,
so far as may be possible within the scope of monetary action, and generally to promote the
economic and financial welfare of Canada”. Bank of Canada Act, Preamble.
Prioritization: The joint statement of the Government of Canada and the Bank of Canada on the
renewal of the inflation-control target (February 24, 1998) clarifies that “The best contribution
monetary policy can make to these goals is through preserving confidence in the value of money
by providing an environment of stable average prices” and expresses the commitment of the
Government and Bank to an explicit inflation-control target (with a similar joint statement on
May 17, 2001).
1.b [1] Inflation-control target range (since 1991), equal to 1-3% (effective since 1995) focused
around the midpoint of 2% and using 12-month CPI inflation. See “Renewal of the Inflation-
Control Target: Background Information” (May 18, 2001).
1.c [1] Explicit override procedure: Bank of Canada Act 14(2)-(3).
2.a [1] Information available in the Bank of Canada Review, e.g. Spring 2001 issue, Table A2:
Major Financial and Economic Indicators.
2.b [1] Policy model described by Richard Black and David Rose (1997), “Canadian Policy
Analysis Model (CPAM)”, Bank of Canada Working Paper 97-16.
2.c [0.5] Rough projections for inflation and output in semiannual Monetary Policy Report and
its Update every other quarter since August 2000.
3.a [1] “Inflation-control (targeting) strategy” (since 1991) is described in the November 1997
Monetary Policy Report. See also “Renewal of the Inflation-Control Target: Background In-
formation”, May 2001.
3.b [0] No minutes available.
3.c [0] No voting records available.
4.a [1] Policy decisions announced at 9am on fixed announcement days (which started only in
December 2000; previously, same day announcement of changes in policy actions).
4.b [1] Press release with announcement of policy decision includes explanation with forward-
looking assessments (at least since 1997).
4.c [0] No explicit policy inclination.
5.a [1] Initially, the main operating instrument was the Bank rate, which (since February 1996)
is the interest rate the Bank of Canada charges on one-day loans to financial institutions and
the ceiling of an operating band of 50 basis points for the overnight rate. Since May 2001,
the Bank’s key policy rate is the Overnight Rate Target, which is the midpoint of the operating
band. Data and graphs on the Bank’s web site suggest near perfect control.
5.b [0.5] Analysis of macroeconomic developments (at least since 1995) and rough inflation
and output forecasts in semiannual Monetary Policy Report, and since August 2000 at quarterly
frequency with the regular Update.
5.c [0.5] Graphical evaluation and some discussion of policy outcomes in Annual Report and
Monetary Policy Report (Update), but without an explicit account of deviations from objec-
tives. (In “Renewal of the Inflation-Control Target: Background Information”, May 2001,
the Bank announced that persistent deviations in inflation from the target midpoint will be ex-
plained in the quarterly Monetary Policy Report (Update). However, the Bank does not provide
any account of the role of monetary policy in the (lack of) achievement of its objectives.)
European Central Bank (http://www.ecb.int)
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1.a [1] Objectives and prioritization: “the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain
price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, it shall support the general
economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the
objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 2 of this Treaty” Protocol on the Statute
of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, Art. 2.
1.b [1] Quantitative definition of price stability: annual increase of the Harmonised Index of
Consumer Prices (HICP) for the Euro area of less than 2 per cent. See ECB press release “A
stability-oriented monetary policy strategy for the ESCB”, 13 October 1998.
1.c [1] Independence: “When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties
conferred upon them by this Treaty and this Statute, neither the ECB, nor a national central
bank, nor any member of their decision making bodies shall seek or take instructions from
Community institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other
body.” Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, Art. 7.
2.a [1] Information available in the Monthly Bulletin, section “Euro area statistics”.
2.b [0 + 1 (1/2001)] Policy model described by G. Fagan, J. Henry and R. Metez, “An Area-
Wide Model (AWM) for the Euro Area”, European Central Bank Working Paper 42, January
2001.
2.c [0 + 0.5 (12/2000)] Since December 2000, medium term conditional inflation and output
projections are published twice a year in the June and December Monthly Bulletin.
3.a [1] “Two Pillar Strategy” with (1) a prominent role for money, and (2) a broadly based
assessment both of the outlook regarding price developments and of the risks to price stability
in the Euro area as a whole. Monthly Bulletin January 1999.
3.b [0] No minutes available.
3.c [0] No voting records available. (It has been suggested that the ECB decides “by consen-
sus”. However, according to the Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, Art.
10(2), the Governing Council shall act by majority voting.)
4.a [1] Policy decisions are announced the same day.
4.b [0.5 + 0.5 (11/2001)] Initially, there were two policy meetings every month, the first of
which was followed by a press conference in which the President provides an introductory
statement with an explanation of the policy decision. Since November 2001, there has been a
monetary policy meeting once a month followed by the press conference.
4.c [0] No explicit policy inclination.
5.a [1] Main operating instruments are minimum bid rate on the main refinancing operations
and the interest rates on the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility.
5.b [0.5] Analysis of current macro developments in Monthly Bulletin.
5.c [0.5] Informal evaluation and discussion of policy outcomes in Monthly Bulletin and Annual
Report, but no explicit account of the role of monetary policy.
Bank of Japan (http://www.boj.or.jp)
1.a [0.5] Multiple objectives without priority: to issue banknotes; to carry out currency and
monetary control aimed at contributing to the sound development of the national economy
through the pursuit of price stability; and, to ensure smooth settlement of funds among banks
and other financial institutions, thereby contributing to the maintenance of an orderly financial
system. Bank of Japan Law Art. 1 and 2.
1.b [0] No precise definition and/or quantification of the objectives could be found.
1.c [1] Independence: “The Bank of Japan’s autonomy regarding currency and monetary con-
trol shall be respected.” Bank of Japan Law, Art. 3.
2.a [1] Data is available at the following web sites: money at Bank of Japan; inflation and
unemployment rate at Statistics Bureau and Statistics Center (www.stat.go.jp); GDP at Cabinet
Office (www.esri.cao.go.jp); capacity utilization at Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
(www.meti.go.jp).
2.b [0] No explicit policy model could be found.
2.c [0 + 0.5 (10/2000)] Since October 2000, the semiannual Outlook and Risk Assessment of
the Economy and Prices contains short-term conditional forecasts for inflation and output by
the Policy Board.
3.a [0] No explicit monetary strategy could be found.
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3.b [1] Non-attributed minutes are released approximately six weeks after policy meeting, in-
cluding summary of discussions, remarks by Government representative and individual votes.
3.c [1] Individual voting records are published together with minutes, approximately six weeks
after the policy meeting.
4.a [1] Policy decisions are announced the same day.
4.b [0.5] Policy explanation at the time of announcement but only when policy decision changes.
4.c [0] No explicit policy inclination.
5.a [1 - 0.5 (3/2001)] Initially, there was a main operating target for the average uncollater-
alized overnight call rate; charts in the Monthly Report of Recent Economic and Financial
Developments show quite some fluctuations but suggest that the targets for the average call
rate were indeed met (with effectively a ‘zero interest rate policy’ since February 12, 1999).
On March 19, 2001 the main operating target was changed to the outstanding balance of the
current accounts at the Bank. This target is very rough and there are significant fluctuations in
the outstanding balance but no explanations for it.
5.b [0.5] Analysis of macroeconomic situation in Monthly Report of Recent Economic and
Financial Developments and (since October 2000) short-term inflation and output forecasts in
the semiannual Outlook and Risk Assessment of the Economy and Prices.
5.c [0.5] Informal evaluation of policy outcome in Monthly Report of Recent Economic and
Financial Developments, without explicitly accounting for deviations between outcomes and
objectives.
(Unfortunately, the Bank of Japan web site appears quite hard to navigate, but for those who
persist it provides very elaborate information.)
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/)
1.a [1] Primary objective: “The primary function of the Bank is to formulate and implement
monetary policy directed to the economic objective of achieving and maintaining stability in
the general level of prices.” Reserve Bank Act 1989, Part II, Sec 8.
In addition: “Have regard to the efficiency and soundness of the financial system” Reserve
Bank Act 1989, Part II, Sec 10; and “In pursuing its price stability objective, the Bank shall
implement monetary policy in a sustainable, consistent and transparent manner and shall seek
to avoid unnecessary instability in output, interest rates and the exchange rate.” Policy Targets
Agreement, December 16, 1999.
1.b [1] Policy target specified in Policy Targets Agreement: 12-monthly increase in the CPI(X)
between 0 and 3 % (from December 1997-1999).
1.c [1] Independence: operational independence subject to Policy Targets Agreement and over-
ride mechanism. See Reserve Bank Act 1989, Part II, Sec 13.
Explicit override mechanism: Reserve Bank Act 1989, Part II, Sec 12
2.a [0.5 + 0.5 (2002)] All the time series except for capacity utilization can be found on the web
site under Statistics. Data on capacity utilization have been available in Excel spreadsheets that
accompany Monetary Policy Statements on the web site, at least since June 2002 (when we first
observed them).
2.b [1] The macroeconomic model used for medium term analysis is presented by Richard
Black, Vincenzo Cassino, Aaron Drew, Eric Hansen, Benjamin Hunt, David Rose and Alasdair
Scott (1997), “The Forecasting and Policy System”, Reserve Bank of New Zealand Research
Paper 43.
2.c [1] The quarterly Monetary Policy Statement includes numerical, unconditional projections
for inflation and output up to three years ahead.
3.a [1] Inflation targeting strategy described in Policy Targets Agreement, December 15, 1997;
a useful complement is “Monetary policy implementation and signalling: Discussion Docu-
ment”, March 1997,
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monpol/about/0047041.html. For a more recent account, see “Inde-
pendent review of the operation of monetary policy: Submission by the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand”, September 2000,
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monpol/review/0096189.pdf.
3.b [1] Comprehensive explanation of policy stance (including medium term macroeconomic
projections) by Reserve Bank Governor published in quarterly Monetary Policy Statement
(about six weeks after Official Cash Rate review dates since March 1999).
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3.c [1] Policy decisions are made by the Governor.
4.a [1] Initially, the formal monetary policy instrument was the daily settlement cash target. Al-
though the cash target was last changed in August 1995, the Governor indicated in his “Speak-
ing notes” for the May 1998 Monetary Policy Statement that any cash target changes would
be promptly announced after the policy meeting. In practice, the monetary policy stance was
essentially conveyed in terms of a target for the Monetary Conditions Index (MCI; weighted
average of trade-weighted exchange rate and 90-day interest rate), starting in December 1996.
These desired MCI levels were announced and explained every quarter with the release of the
Economic Projections (discontinued in March 1998) and the Monetary Policy Statement. Since
March 1999, the main operating target has been changed from settlement cash to the Official
Cash Rate (which is the midpoint of an operating band of 50 basis points for the interbank
interest rate) and policy decisions have been promptly announced at Official Cash Rate review
dates.(Focusing on the intermediate operating target (MCI), 4.a would also be [1].)
4.b [0+ 0.5 (3/1999) + 0.5 (12/2000)] Initially, there were no explanations of formal policy
decisions. After the introduction of the Official Cash Rate in March 1999, explanations first
only in case of policy changes, but since December 2000 also for no-change decisions.
(Focusing on the intermediate operating target (MCI), 4.b would be [1 - 0.5 (3/1999) + 0.5
(12/2000)].)
4.c [0 + 1 (3/1999)] Initially, there was no inclination for the formal policy instrument, but
since March 1999 the quarterly Monetary Policy Statement have included three-year ahead
unconditional projections for the 90-day bank bill rate, which is very closely related to the
Official Cash Rate.(Focusing on the intermediate operating target (MCI), the quarterly Monetary Policy Statement
included three-year ahead unconditional projections for the MCI until March 1999, so 4.c
would be [1].)
5.a [0 + 1 (3/1999)] Initially, when daily settlement cash target was the formal operating target,
there was no evaluation of its achievement. Since March 1999, the main operating target is
the Official Cash Rate, which is controlled almost perfectly (e.g. see Andy Brookes and Tim
Hampton, ‘The Official Cash Rate one year on’, Reserve Bank Bulletin, June 2000)
(Focusing on the intermediate operating target, deviations of the MCI from its target used to be
discussed in the quarterly Monetary Policy Statement, so 5.a would be [1].)
5.b [0.5] Analysis of macroeconomic developments and short-term forecasts for inflation in
quarterly Monetary Policy Statement.
5.c [0.5] Graphical evaluation of policy outcome in quarterly Monetary Policy Statement, with-
out an explicit account how monetary policy contributed to the achievement of objectives.
Swedish Riksbank (http://www.riksbank.com)
1.a [0.5 + 0.5 (1/1999)] “The objective of the Riksbank’s operations shall be to maintain
price stability. In addition, the Riksbank shall promote a safe and efficient payment system.”
Sveriges Riksbank Act, Chapter 1, Art. 2 (amendment effective January 1999).
1.b [1] Inflation target (formulated in 1993, effective since 1995) of 2 % with a margin of ± 1
percentage point. Annual Report 1997.
1.c [0.5 + 0.5 (1/1999)] Independence: “The Riksbank is responsible for monetary policy. No
authority may determine the decisions made by the Riksbank on issues relating to monetary
policy.” Constitution Act, Chapter 9, Art. 12; and “Members of the Executive Board may
not seek nor take instructions when they are fulfilling their monetary policy duties.” Sveriges
Riksbank Act, Chapter 3, Art. 2 (both amendments effective January 1999).
2.a [0.5 + 0.5 (12/1999)] Since 2001, all information is available from the Riksbank web site;
data on money under the heading Statistics, and data on inflation, GDP, unemployment rate and
capacity utilization (in the form of econometric estimates of the output gap) in Excel spread-
sheets that are made available for downloading with each Inflation Report (first for December
1999).
2.b [0] No explicit policy model could be found.
2.c [1] Conditional inflation and output forecasts for a two-year horizon are published in the
quarterly Inflation Report.
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3.a [1] Monetary policy framework is explained as ‘rule-of-thumb’ adjustment of repo rate
based deviation of inflation forecast from target, with two exceptions: (1) temporary inflation
effects are disregarded, and (2) adjustment is gradual in case of costly real effects. See Annual
Report 2000, p. 10; and speech on ‘Monetary Policy’ by Lars Heikensten, October 22, 1997.
(Essentially flexible inflation forecast targeting.)
3.b [1] Detailed non-attributed minutes including policy discussions, released 2-3 weeks after
the meeting.
3.c [0 + 1 (5/2002)] Initially, attributed reservations against the decision were sometimes noted
in the minutes, but it was not clear whether these were (the only) dissents. This was clarified
in May 2002, so that the minutes effectively provide voting records.
4.a [1] Policy decisions are promptly announced after the policy meeting before implementa-
tion.
4.b [0.5 + 0.5 (10/1999)] Explanation of adjustments in policy instrument, and since October
1999 of all policy decisions at time of announcement.
4.c [0 + 1 (3/2002)] Policy inclination has been provided since March 2002.
5.a [1] Main operating instrument: Repo rate.
5.b [0.5 + 0.5 (3/2000)] Analysis of macroeconomic developments and macroeconomic fore-
casts in quarterly Inflation Report. In addition, annual discussion of past inflation forecast
errors in March Inflation Report since 2000.
5.c [0.5 + 0.5 (3/2000)] Initially, review of policy outcome in Annual Report. Since 2000, an-
nual evaluation of inflation outcome over last three years in March Inflation Report, including
a discussion of the effect of monetary policy.
Swiss National Bank (http://www.snb.ch)
1.a [0.5] Objectives: “The principal task of the National Bank is to regulate the country’s
money circulation, to facilitate payment transactions, and to pursue a credit and monetary
policy serving the interests of the country as a whole.” National Bank Law Art. 2(1)
1.b [0 + 1 (12/1999)] Quantitative definition of price stability since December 1999: inflation
rate as measured by the national consumer price index of less than 2 % per annum.
1.c [0.5 + 0.5 (1/2000)] “As an independent central bank, the Swiss National Bank shall pursue
a monetary policy serving the interests of the country as a whole”, Federal Constitution Art.
99(2), January 2000 amendment.
2.a [1] Money, inflation, output and unemployment data are available in the Statistical Monthly
Bulletin. Other data is available via Swiss Statistics web site (www.statistics.admin.ch).
2.b [0] Although Peter Stalder, “An econometric macro-model for Switzerland”, Quarterly
Bulletin 2, June 2001, discusses a policy model, it is only in French and German and only
presents a few of the equations.
2.c [0 + 0.5 (12/1999)] Since December 1999, inflation forecast for the three ensuing years,
presented in the June and December Quarterly Bulletin (French and German only) and at the
half-yearly media news conference (in English).
3.a [1] Initially, monetary policy framework was focused on medium term monetary growth
targets. Since 2000, this has been abandoned in favor of effectively an inflation targeting
strategy. See “Monetary policy of the Swiss National Bank” in various issues of the Annual
Report.
3.b [0] No minutes available.
3.c [0] No voting records available.
4.a [1] Initially, annual announcement concerning longer run monetary growth target. After
adopting a target for the LIBOR, policy decisions are announced the same day.
4.b [1] Explanation of all policy decisions at time of announcement.
4.c [0] No explicit policy inclination.
5.a [1 - 0.5 (12/1999)] Initially, graphical evaluation of monetary targets in Annual Report, in-
cluding explanation for deviations. Since December 1999, operational target range of 100 basis
points for three-month LIBOR rate graphically evaluated in Annual Report, but no explanations
for significant fluctuations within target.
5.b [0] Analysis of macroeconomic developments in Quarterly Bulletin, but only brief abstract
available in English. No analysis in Monthly Statistical Bulletin, merely graphs (again only
brief abstract in English).
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5.c [0] The Bank only gives a review of the year, but doesn’t account for discrepancies between
policy outcome and target.
Bank of England (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk)
1.a [1] “The objectives of the Bank of England are to maintain price stability and, subject to
that, support the economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government, including its objectives for
growth and employment.” Bank of England Act 1998, Ch 11 Part II, Sec 11
1.b [1] The price stability objective is to achieve underlying inflation, measured by the RPI
excluding mortgage interest rates, of 2.5%.
1.c [1] Operational responsibility: Bank of England Act 1998, Ch 11, Part II, Sec 10.
Explicit override mechanism: Bank of England Act 1998, Ch 11, Part II, Sec 19.
2.a [0.5 + 0.5 (2002)] Time series are available from the Office of National Statistics web site
(www.statistics.gov.uk), initially with the exception of capacity utilization, and more recently
also at the Bank of England web site.
2.b [0 + 1 (4/1999)] Extensive documentation on policy models in Economic Models at the
Bank of England, April 1999 (see also September 2000 Update), and the computer code of the
macroeconometric model is available on the web site.
2.c [1] Conditional inflation and output forecasts for a two-year horizon are published in the
quarterly Inflation Report.
3.a [1] Monetary policy framework described on web site
(www.bankofengland.co.uk/framework.htm)
3.b [1] Comprehensive non-attributed minutes released about two weeks after policy meeting,
including summary of discussions and individual votes.
3.c [1] Individual voting records included together with minutes.
4.a [1] Policy decisions announced the same day.
4.b [0.5] Explanation of policy decisions at time of announcement when policy changes (with
a few exceptions).
4.c [0] No explicit policy inclination.
5.a [1] Main operating instrument: Repo rate.
5.b [0.5 + 0.5 (8/1999)] Short-term forecasts for inflation and output, and analysis of macroe-
conomic developments in quarterly Inflation Report. In addition, discussion of the MPC’s
forecasting record in the August Inflation Report (since 1999).
5.c [0.5] Evaluation of policy outcome only casually in quarterly Inflation Report.
Federal Reserve (http://www.federalreserve.gov/)
1.a [0.5] Multiple objectives without priority: “The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the mon-
etary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase
production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices and
moderate long-term interest rates.” Federal Reserve Act Sec. 225a.
1.b [0] No explicit target for objectives.
1.c [0.5] No explicit instrument independence in Federal Reserve Act.
2.a [1] All data available from the FRED database at the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis web
site (www.stls.frb.org).
2.b [1] Policy model described by Flint Brayton and Peter A. Tinsley (1996) “A Guide to
FRB/US: A Macroeconomic Model of the United States”, Federal Reserve Board Finance and
Economics Discussion Paper 96-42.
2.c [0.5] Short-term economic projections for inflation and output are published in the semian-
nual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress.
3.a [0] No explicit monetary policy strategy could be found.
3.b [1] Non-attributed minutes, including discussion of arguments and individual votes, re-
leased about six weeks after policy meeting.
3.c [1] Individual voting records included together with minutes
4.a [1] Decisions about adjustments in policy instrument announced the same day.
4.b [0.5 + 0.5 (5/1999)] Initially, only explanation at time of announcement in case of policy
changes, and since May 1999 also when policy remains unchanged.
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4.c [0 + 1 (5/1999)] Since May 1999, explicit phrase in statement after every meeting that
describes the policy tilt, clarified in Federal Reserve Board Press Release “FOMC announced
modifications of its disclosure procedures”, January 19, 2000.
5.a [1] Annual evaluation of target for Federal Funds rate reveals near perfect control. For
instance, see Domestic Open Market Operations During 2001, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, Markets Group, February 2002.
5.b [0] Macroeconomic analysis and short-term forecasts for inflation and output in the semi-
annual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress.
5.c [0.5] Only informal evaluation of policy outcomes in the semiannual Monetary Policy Re-
port to the Congress.
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Table 2: Central Bank Transparency Index, June 1998
1998 Index Political Economic Procedural Policy Operational Total
Australia 3 1 1 1.5 1.5 8
Canada 3 2.5 1 2 2 10.5
Euro Zone - - - - - -
Japan 1.5 1 2 1.5 2 8
New Zealand 3 2.5 3 1 1 10.5
Sweden 2 1.5 2 1.5 2 9
Switzerland 1 1 1 2 1 6
United Kingdom 3 1.5 3 1.5 2 11
United States 1 2.5 2 1.5 1.5 8.5
Table 3: Average Transparency Index, June 1998 - June 2002
Average Index Political Economic Procedural Policy Operational Total
Australia 3 1.2 1 1.5 1.5 8.2
Canada 3 2.5 1 2 2 10.5
Euro Zone∗ 3 1.8 1 1.6 2 9.4
Japan 1.5 1.2 2 1.5 1.8 8
New Zealand 3 2.6 3 2.4 1.8 12.8
Sweden 2.8 1.8 2.2 2 2.6 11.4
Switzerland 1.9 1.3 1 2 0.7 6.9
United Kingdom 3 2.4 3 1.5 2.3 12.2
United States 1 2.5 2 2.7 1.5 9.7
∗ Euro Zone average index for June 1999 - June 2002.
Table 4: Increase in Central Bank Transparency Index, June 1998 - June 2002
Change in Index Political Economic Procedural Policy Operational Total
Australia 0 +1 0 0 0 +1
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0
Euro Zone∗ 0 +1.5 0 +0.5 0 +2
Japan 0 +0.5 0 0 -0.5 0
New Zealand 0 +0.5 0 +2 +1 +3.5
Sweden +1 +0.5 +1 +1.5 +1 +5
Switzerland +1.5 +0.5 0 0 -0.5 +1.5
United Kingdom 0 +1.5 0 0 +0.5 +2
United States 0 0 0 +1.5 0 +1.5
∗ Euro Zone change in index for June 1999 - June 2002.
36
Ta
bl
e5
:C
or
re
la
tio
n
be
tw
ee
n
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
In
de
x
an
d
Po
lic
y
O
ut
co
m
es
(19
98
-20
02
)
a.
Co
rre
la
tio
n
w
ith
Av
er
ag
e
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
In
de
x
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
µ
y
σ
y
µ
pi
σ
pi
µ
u
σ
u
Po
lit
ic
al
-
0.
17
[0
.66
]
0.
11
[0
.78
]
0.
44
[0
.24
]
0.
45
[0
.23
]
0.
63
[0
.07
]
0.
37
[0
.32
]
Ec
on
om
ic
-
0.
07
[0
.85
]
-
0.
06
[0
.88
]
0.
47
[0
.20
]
-
0.
06
[0
.89
]
0.
21
[0
.59
]
0.
25
[0
.52
]
Pr
oc
ed
ur
al
-
0.
65
[0
.06
]
0.
19
[0
.63
]
-
0.
04
[0
.92
]
0.
07
[0
.85
]
-
0.
25
[0
.52
]
0.
14
[0
.73
]
Po
lic
y
-
0.
06
[0
.88
]
0.
15
[0
.70
]
0.
17
[0
.67
]
-
0.
09
[0
.81
]
-
0.
28
[0
.46
]
0.
21
[0
.58
]
O
pe
ra
tio
na
l
-
0.
45
[0
.22
]
0.
53
[0
.14
]
0.
09
[0
.81
]
0.
13
[0
.73
]
0.
44
[0
.23
]
0.
53
[0
.14
]
To
ta
l
-
0.
50
[0
.17
]
0.
28
[0
.47
]
0.
36
[0
.35
]
0.
21
[0
.60
]
0.
26
[0
.49
]
0.
47
[0
.21
]
b.
Co
rre
la
tio
n
w
ith
19
98
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
In
de
x
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
µ
y
σ
y
µ
pi
σ
pi
µ
u
σ
u
Po
lit
ic
al
-
0.
17
[0
.69
]
-
0.
11
[0
.79
]
0.
55
[0
.16
]
0.
64
[0
.09
]
0.
86
[0
.01
]
0.
19
[0
.65
]
Ec
on
om
ic
-
0.
04
[0
.92
]
-
0.
05
[0
.90
]
0.
42
[0
.30
]
-
0.
05
[0
.91
]
0.
42
[0
.30
]
0.
44
[0
.27
]
Pr
oc
ed
ur
al
-
0.
60
[0
.11
]
0.
06
[0
.88
]
0.
00
[1
.00
]
-
0.
07
[0
.88
]
0.
00
[1
.00
]
0.
42
[0
.30
]
Po
lic
y
0.
67
[0
.07
]
-
0.
12
[0
.77
]
-
0.
12
[0
.77
]
-
0.
44
[0
.27
]
-
0.
19
[0
.66
]
-
0.
60
[0
.11
]
O
pe
ra
tio
na
l
-
0.
03
[0
.94
]
0.
30
[0
.47
]
-
0.
12
[0
.78
]
-
0.
09
[0
.84
]
0.
34
[0
.41
]
-
0.
01
[0
.97
]
To
ta
l
-
0.
29
[0
.48
]
0.
01
[0
.99
]
0.
42
[0
.30
]
0.
19
[0
.65
]
0.
70
[0
.05
]
0.
38
[0
.35
]
Co
rre
la
tio
ns
o
ft
he
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
in
de
x
w
ith
th
e
m
ea
n
µ
an
d
st
an
da
rd
de
v
ia
tio
n
σ
o
ft
he
re
al
G
D
P
o
u
tp
ut
ga
p
y
(19
98
Q1
-20
02
Q4
,c
o
m
pu
te
d
as
pe
rc
en
td
ev
ia
tio
n
fro
m
H
P
tr
en
d
fro
m
19
93
Q1
),a
n
n
u
al
CP
Ii
nfl
at
io
n
pi
,
an
d
th
eu
n
em
pl
oy
m
en
tr
at
e
u
.
M
ea
ns
an
d
st
an
da
rd
de
v
ia
tio
ns
ar
e
co
m
pu
te
d
u
sin
g
qu
ar
te
rly
19
98
Q1
-20
02
Q4
da
ta
fo
rA
us
tra
lia
,C
an
ad
a,
Eu
ro
zo
n
e,
Ja
pa
n,
N
ew
Ze
al
an
d,
Sw
ed
en
,S
w
itz
er
la
nd
,U
K
an
d
U
S,
ex
ce
pt
fo
rS
w
itz
er
la
nd
(un
em
plo
ym
en
td
at
a
19
98
Q1
-20
02
Q2
),
U
K
(un
em
plo
ym
en
td
at
a
19
98
Q1
-20
02
Q3
),
an
d
N
ew
Ze
al
an
d
(ou
tpu
td
at
a
19
98
Q1
-20
02
Q3
).
Ta
bl
e
5.
a
u
se
s
th
e
av
er
ag
e
19
98
-2
00
2
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
in
de
x
fro
m
Ta
bl
e
3;
Ta
bl
e
5.
b
u
se
s
th
e
19
98
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
in
de
x
fro
m
Ta
bl
e
2
an
d
so
ex
cl
ud
es
th
e
Eu
ro
Zo
ne
.
Co
rre
la
tio
ns
sig
ni
fic
an
ta
t1
0%
le
v
el
ar
e
bo
ld
an
d
p-
va
lu
es
ar
e
in
sq
ua
re
br
ac
ke
ts
.
So
ur
ce
s:
Ec
on
om
ic
da
ta
fro
m
O
EC
D
(Q
ua
rte
rly
N
at
io
na
lA
cc
ou
nt
sS
ta
tis
tic
s;
M
ai
n
Ec
on
om
ic
In
di
ca
to
rs
;Q
ua
rte
rly
La
bo
rF
o
rc
e
St
at
ist
ic
s),
Eu
ro
st
at
an
d
U
S
B
ur
ea
u
o
fL
ab
or
St
at
ist
ic
s.
37
